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Abstract
The contradiction between physical and economical sciences concern-
ing the growth of the production/consumption mechanism is analyzed. It
is then shown that if one wishes to keep the security level stable or to
enhance it in a growing economy the cost of security grows faster than
the gross wealth. The result is a typical evolution in which the net wealth
increases up to a maximum, then abruptly collapses. Besides this, any
system of relations based on a growing volume of exchanges is bound to
go progressively out of control.
The voluntary blindness of the ruling classes toward these facts is
leading our societies to a disaster. This fate is not inescapable provided
we learn to dismantle the myth of perpetual growth.
1 Foreword
The history of the human kind on the planet Earth is extremely short as com-
pared to geological or cosmic times, but is felt as being already quite long in the
human perception. In fact the part of our common past properly considered as
historical has had a duration of approximately 400 generations: nothing, in a
world where every year some 125 million new human beings are born (more than
343,000 per day). Even in such a short time span the impact of humanity on
Earth, never irrelevant (as some of the talks in these conference will show), has
undergone a sharp raise starting from some fifteen generations ago. The birth
and development of modern experimental science (mainly physics in all specifica-
tions) spurred technology, in a previously unthinkable way. These new powerful
tools have been made available to a species defining itself as ”intelligent”; a
species whose behaviour has at all times been conformed to non-scientific cri-
teria and directed to not properly rational ends. The de facto behaviour of the
human beings has however ever since been covered, like by a coat or a sort of
Grecian theater mask, by a conceptual framework intended to justify it or even
motivate it ex post. Any human society, since Sumerian times up to the present
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Figure 1: Growth of the world population in time; the lower line in the abscissae
measures time in conventional human generations (25 years). The dashed line
marks the date (some 14 generations ago) from which the modern ”explosion”
of the population starts, accompanying the industrial revolution.
day, has worked out an ideological self-representation that ”explains” it is right
that it happens precisely what happens.
2 The role of science and the problem of limits
The development of the scientific knowledge and method has progressively
brought to evidence some inconsistencies or plain contradictions between ideo-
logical visions and the material advancement of human societies. These incon-
sistencies and contradictions have in general to do with the concept of limit,
meant as material constraint. In ideological views, different and changing in
time as they are, the very idea of ”limit” has never been popular: one meets
sheer refusal (we shall see an interesting example tomorrow evening in the ”Last
call” movie) or, at times, the recognition that ’well, material constraints do ex-
ist, but they are exceedingly far from our present condition, so that they are
and must be uninfluential on the decisions we are called to assume here and
now’.
Another way to describe this attitude could be that mankind tends and
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pretends to live exclusively in the present, removing any concern about a non-
immediate future. In short, a time dimension with a thickness close to zero.
This behaviour is what we currently expect from non-human animal species;
the point however is that the human being, especially after the onset of modern
science, has got tools and methods enabling to look, in a reasonably reliable
way, even into a non-immediate future. What can be seen in that, scientifically
fathomable, future are developments contradicting the perspectives advertised
by ideology (here I am not referring to any peculiar political vision, rather to
the most common way of thinking of humans and in particular of the members
of the ”ruling class”).
The importance and inescapability of material constraints is indeed rather
obvious and has been perceived as such all along the history of human thought.
That awareness, however, has in general not exerted any real and effective influ-
ence on actions. After the start of the industrial revolution we find an example of
such awareness in the positions of rev. Malthus, who apparently concentrated
on the demographic issue only. Only in very recent times, however, ”exact”
sciences have tackled the problem of constraints: general public was involved
in 1972, when The limits to growth was published. We shall recall that event
tomorrow afternoon. The report, produced by a team of the MIT (Donella
Meadows, Dennis Meadows, Jørgen Randers, William Behrens III) and com-
missioned by the Club of Rome, was promoted by Aurelio Peccei, a native of
the city where we are now.
The Limits to Growth was immediately attacked (ideologically) both from
the ”left” and from the ”right”: the idea that material growth of the economy
could have physical limits was unacceptable. This pretended ”unacceptability” is
related to a sort of human grandiose delusion that should be matter for psychol-
ogists, but is in fact deeply rooted in a culture, especially European, now spread
worldwide by right of conquest, which maintains that matter is subordinate to
”spirit”. ”Spirit” here is not the one of religion, rather, if anything, the one of
Hegelianism; but I neither can nor want to enter philosophical considerations,
so let me drop this issue.
It’s a given that matter: a) exists; b) evolves according to laws which depend
neither on philosophical nor on economical schools and are not at all influenced
by political affairs. Be they acceptable or not, no parliament can reform the
physical laws and they are not even listed in the stock market.
Since 1972 to the present day a true scientific literature has been produced
concerning the material constraints human societies cannot avoid to come to
terms with, even though they are not willing to do so. A trivial search on an
academic search engine pinpoints in a split second more than 2,000,000 scien-
tific papers on the climate change issue, produced in universities and research
institutions. If you try a query on the peak oil you find not less than 1,000,000
articles, and so on. For comparison, a subject like superconductivity gives less
than 650,000 answers and a general term, typical of my normal research activity,
like cosmology produces less than 500,000 titles.
National and international conferences have grown in number and frequency
and appeals have been proposed to reroute the world economy and to curb
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the mythical ”growth”. A prestigious example has been the Stockholm mem-
orandum, signed in 2011 by 18 Nobel laureates. Positive intentions have been
expressed hither and thither; some states have signed agreements such as the
Kyoto protocol of 1997, or have defined targets to be pursued, like the 20-20-20
directive of the European Union; and so on. Something has started to move
and is moving. In substance, however, the problem has not been tackled in its
root and the global situation has worsened; in the best case one worries about
the symptoms, not about the disease.
3 Economics
What I referred to above, when writing of the boom of specialized literature,
were the sciences of nature, all more or less ”exact”, provided this attribute
makes sense. Those sciences deal with material quantities and measure in units
like kilograms and Joules (or kWh). In that context not anything concerning
the future is clear and unambiguous; there are uncertain and even controversial
issues. The bases, however, and the rules of the game are definitely certain:
the discussion may be about technical problems and ultimately on details, even
if non-marginal ones (we shall see in the next days of the conference), but the
substance is unique and clear.
But not only the sciences of nature exist; other disciplines can be qualified
as sciences too, because of the method and accuracy in analysis and applica-
tion. In particular, in the matter that we shall be discussing in these days a
fundamental role is played by economics. A layman, as I am on this respect, is
led to say that the object of economy as a science is human behaviour, like in a
sort of social psychology applied to exchange relationships of goods and services
within a given society; I should include also the production of goods and ser-
vices directed, in a way or another, to the exchange. If it is really so (I beg the
pardon of economists) analyses, ”laws”, mathematical formalization are neces-
sarily statistical and the observations are mainly empirical, axioms are quite
different from those of physics or even more of mathematics. In economics basic
hypotheses, more than axioms, betray also the (human) world views typical of
one or another society and lack the logical cogency of the axioms of natural
sciences.
Having said that, economics too has enormously grown in complexity, inter-
nal differentiation and sophistication of the technical tools it uses. Economics
is formulated in refined mathematical terms, manipulates quantitative data and
produces numerical predictions. Of course a person like me, with a physicist’s
(and engineer’s) mentality, gets puzzled looking at the numbers appearing in
newspapers, even in the pages dedicated to economy and finance; not because
of the values in themselves, but rather because of the systematic absence of
anything like an uncertainty interval or, when modelling is used (i.e. almost
always), of a confidence interval for predictions: we shall discuss this aspect on
Thursday. My perplexity, as I have said, concerns communication through the
media, but that is the channel which conveys messages to the general public.
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Of course economy deals with material quantities, the ones measured in kg,
kWh and so on, but the most important quantity is in the end money ; at least,
everything ends being expressed in monetary terms. Now, again, a physicist
cannot help but remark that money is fundamentally a conventional quantity,
that expresses, within a given society, the distribution of the buying power (to
a great extent coinciding with power, without further specifications), i.e. of the
right of access to goods and services globally produced. In other words, there is
an objective poverty, consisting in the scarcity or material inaccessibility of some
good; then there is a ”social” poverty depending on the unequal distribution of
the ”access titles”. In our globalized world the difference between the two forms
is more and more evanescent. In conclusion, though it appears to be paradox-
ical, the poor is poor because ”he agrees to be poor” even though he does not
know: he partakes in a giant Monopoly game whose rules he, more or less con-
sciously, accepts. All this has nothing to do with the laws of thermodynamics,
with the conservation of matter and energy, with climatology, with the laws of
electromagnetism, and so on. Disparities and the fair or unjust distribution of
the ”access titles” is a match internal to mankind, but that match is played on
a material stage; the rules of the game are, with more or less difficulty, pliable,
the playing ground and its constraints not at all.
Economical science, by its nature, has to deal with both the material context
and the internal affairs of human societies. It seems however, at least to an
inexperienced person as I am, that the attention is most often focussed on
human dynamics rather than on the material background. I shall fetch an
image from a field very distant from economy, but much more familiar to me.
Einstein succeeded in describing the gravitational interaction by a very famous
(among specialists, of course) equation of which he used to say that the two
sides (linked by the = sign) were quite different: one was ”marble”, and it
was the one rigorously and exclusively cast in mathematical and in particular
in geometrical terms; the other was ”wooden”, and it was the one containing
matter and energy, both entities expressed in mathematical forms without being
mathematical in nature. In an entirely different area and by pure analogy I think
I can say the proper domain of economy too has two sides: one ”marble”, which
is the side of material bases; the other ”wooden”, which is the side of social
dynamics. My feeling (and may be this conference will help to discuss the issue
and make me change my mind), is that very often economy mistakes ”marble”
for ”wood”, without, by that, ”marble” ceasing to be what it is.
4 The problem of growth
On the background described so far we find the prickly problem of ”growth”.
”Growth”, at first sight, is the most often used word on the press, by politicians,
by economists when the discussion is about the world ”crisis”, started in 2008
and not yet ended, and about the way out from it. On the nature of that ”crisis”
I think this conference will express peculiar viewpoints; for the time being let
us limit ourselves to the question: growth of what?
5
In the debate among social parts and in the journalistic and popular lan-
guage the growth people want to start up again is of consumption, of jobs (of
consumption in order to make jobs grow), of investments, of production, of the
”confidence” of ”markets” and so on. When we come to the numbers, all that is
recapped and summarized in one single parameter: the Gross Domestic Prod-
uct, in short GDP. The latter, in the popularization of the media, is not even
expressed by an absolute value, but only as an annual percent growth (lately
even decrease): ”GDP is at x%”. Literally speaking this is nonsense; for the
majority it means that things are good or bad, without worrying about why
they are good or bad. Long since there is an active debate on the reliability
of the Gross Domestic Product as an indicator of the socioeconomic wellness
and prof. Giovannini could tell us much about the subject; as a matter of fact
people goes on using GDP.
As I understand it, and I am a layman, GDP measures the volume of material
and immaterial exchanges within a given economic system, provided they have a
monetary value. That is the quantity whose growth everybody invokes. Stated
in these terms one may have the impression that the issue is essentially an
internal affair of human societies, all the more so, since, as I have said, the
exchange can also be immaterial: a violin lesson contributes to the formation of
the GDP, provided it is paid for (what is free of charge, in this context, besides
not been counted, is at the least an extravagance).
Beyond the political and journalistic language, I can guess that the theoret-
ical framework that includes the growth, rests on two postulates.
• a) The vitality of any human society can last in time if there are dispari-
ties among its members: in an electric circuit no current circulates if the
potential is the same everywhere.
• b) Economic disparities, however, have drawbacks, dangerous for social
stability. If you want to find a solution to these drawbacks or at least
keep their effects under control, the volume of the economic exchanges
must keep on growing: some would say that in order to maintain social
differences, without producing lacerations, the global ”wealth” is bound
to a perpetual growth.
Is this the essence of an amateur theory of growth? Maybe.
However the problem is that any ”exchange”, including the apparently im-
material ones, has unavoidably a material base. By consequence the growth
of the Gross Domestic Product is necessarily and in any case a growth of the
amount of matter manipulated and transformed every year and an increase in
the number of transformations to which even a fixed amount of matter is sub-
ject every year (at least part of the present audience has probably caught here
a reference to the growth of the energy demand). When we speak of matter
and its transformations we face rules of the game on which we have no control;
they are, as I have already reminded, totally insensitive to political and even
social affairs, to the spread, to the stock market quotations, as well as to the
unemployment rate. At this stage the contradiction becomes manifest and, it is
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to be said, on one side we may heap opinions, on the other we find very stubborn
facts.
There are three ways to manage these contradictions by the supporters of
growth:
• reject the problem;
• recognize that the contradiction exists, but maintain that its practical
effects are delayed to back of beyond future;
• propose a socioeconomic system where the material base remains constant
and the GDP increases in its immaterial part only.
No doubt that the first ”solution” is the most widespread. It includes those
people who look at the issue of growth as at a set of ”environmental problems”;
for these people the ”environment” becomes rather a means to promote the
”growth” of the economy: ”let us invest in ’green technologies’ and GDP will
start to grow again”. It has barely to be said that the ”environment” has no
problem at all; rather it is we only who have problems. This attitude has the
rationality of a guy with a broken leg who plans to participate to a high jump
competition.
The second option implies an always present debate on the closeness or
not of the walls that prevent an indefinite ”growth”. We are going to discuss
this matter tomorrow, but I think I can anticipate that by now the limits are
indeed very close, even on the time scale typical of human affairs. In any case
recognizing the problem, then differing it, for sure does not solve it. It recalls a
bit the sentence ”In the long run we are all dead” by John Maynard Keynes, or
the ”apre`s nous le de´luge” by Louis XV of France, or even the ”seize the day”,
modern version of Horace’s carpe diem. Rationality dwells elsewhere.
Coming to the third solution some might propose, maybe we will discuss it
in the next days. There are however various inconveniences. In order to allow
GDP to grow keeping the amount of manipulated matter fixed, one must let the
number of ”manipulations” performed on a given amount of matter increase,
but also the ”manipulations” unavoidably have a material (in particular energy)
content which is subject to the same constraints as the whole material world.
Furthermore there is a more subtle limit: if we want the volume of exchanges
to grow keeping the exchanged quantities fixed, we must increase the exchange
velocity, but velocity too has an insurmountable upper limit in any given physical
system. I’ll come again on this later. One might think to only build on virtual
exchanges, like the more and more happens in the world of finance, but even so
a remark is inescapable: if quantities remain stable but the swirling exchange
of ”access titles” grows, what grows in the end, like in a worldwide Monopoly
game, are inequalities. There is evidence of this phenomenon in our world, even
though, at the moment one pretends quantities also to go on growing: there is
a limited number of subjects, in prospect the more and more limited, who own
disproportionate ”withdrawal rights” against a growing number of subjects who
are losing their economic autonomy; see figure (2). Of course this is the type of
growth that produces more immediately explosive effects.
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Figure 2: Time evolution of the Gini coefficient in the world. The Gini coefficient
measures the inequality of the income distribution. The situation has worsened
almost everywhere in 30 years; Brasil, where the inequality is very high, is an
exception.
5 An example: governing an ever-growing sys-
tem
Mine is an introductory relation, so that I limit this talk to a review of various
problems and topics without examining them in depth. Thorough analyzes will
be made in the course of the conference. Nonetheless, before closing, I would
like to develop an exercise, touching upon features of the ”growth” mechanism,
which are usually not considered or remain in the shade.
Everybody knows that there is a problem with, and a live debate on, anthro-
pogenic climate changes; that there is a problem with the depletion of energy
resources and with the scarcity of mineral resources; that there is a problem
with fresh and clean water; degradation and reduction of available farming soils
is an issue often pointed out to the public, and so on. About these topics we
shall discuss in the next days.
Now I would like to draw your attention on the control and safety of a
growing complex system. I will do it in a simplified way trying to reduce as
much as possible the technicalities and to evidence the fundamental machinery.
5.1 A network of exchange links
An economy, as we have seen, is based on a system of exchange relations. The
growth that many invoke implies also an increase of the exchange opportunities,
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the number of companies, the market segments. We may think of human be-
ings exchanging something among them; or villages connected by pathways; or
factories and markets connected by roads and information channels.... We may
sketch all this thinking of a three-dimensional network (I should say a graph)
whose vertices (or knots) are the things I have just mentioned. Let us suppose
that the vertices are in the number of N . The produced wealth is not per se
depending on the number of vertices, but rather on the exchange fluxes among
them and, in an abstract market, all knots should be on the same footing. In
other words the best conditions for such economy would be obtained if any sin-
gle knot could exchange something with any other single knot in the network.
The relevant quantity emerging from these considerations is the number of links
among the knots. Now, the total number N of possible links among N vertices
is given by a simple formula of the binomial development:
N =
N (N − 1)
2
(1)
You may notice that when N grows, N grows faster and precisely with a
quadratic law: to 2 vertices it corresponds 1 possible link; 3 vertices, 3 links; 4
vertices, 6 links; 5 vertices, 10 links; and so on.
So far I have spoken of possible links, but wealth originates from actual
exchanges, not from possible exchanges. Once a channel is available, the flux
through it will initially be small, but, if wealth, whatever it is, depends on the
total flux and people wants it to grow, then also the flux on each single link must
grow. If we call ni the number of transactions or exchanges or trips per year
through the i-th available connection, the total annual volume of exchanges Φ
will of course be
Φ =
N∑
i=1
ni
The formula may be simplified a bit using the average annual flux through a
link, < n >, and becomes
Φ =< n > N (2)
If I wouldn’t be afraid of the economists’ reproaches I would be tempted
of saying that Φ is proportional to the Gross Domestic Product of our system;
anyway I shall say that it is proportional to the wealth R produced by the
system:
R = ρΦ (3)
The ρ factor is a parameter carrying all the ambiguity of quantities measured
by money, however if R is bound to grow, as it is maintained by many, the
same will do Φ and this will be possible either through any of the two factors
in formula (2) or through both jointly. In any case the growth of the number of
possible links, N, requires the growth of the number of ”poles” N .
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Coming to the average annual flux through a link, in its evaluation also
those links enter which are in principle accessible but not operating and along
which the flux is zero; this fact implies that < n > can grow: a) letting the
number of active exchange links increase up to the greatest possible value for
a given number of vertices [formula (1)]; b) letting the flux through each single
channel grow. Now, option a) has to comply with the maximal capacity of a
single vertex, which in turn depends on the nature of the vertex: if we have to
do with an electronic communication network the knots are electronic devices
(servers, routers, laptops...) each of which has a maximal capability of managing
separate connections, because of the physical constraints typical of the employed
materials, of the commutation speed, etc. In order to avoid a typical objection
of those who deny the existence of limits, I immediately specify that I am
not referring to specific machines of the present technological generation that
would then be surpassed by the next generation, then by further one, then....
. I am referring to ideal machines working only on the base of the physical
principles which rule the atomic physics (the branch of physics at the base
of the applications of electronics) and invariably imply the saturation of the
capacity of any calculation or data processing device.
If the vertices of the graph are human beings the problems are the same but
for the fact that saturation is reached much earlier.
Let’s come to option b). Growth requires an increase of the flux transiting
over every single link of the network. Here I will not spend too many words: be it
a road or an optical fiber, a railway or a satellite communication channel, under
a continuous push towards growth the trend in time of the flux is represented
by a logistic curve, like the one shown in figure (3)
The saturation of all or part of the links is unavoidable and the saturation
level depends on the nature of the link. Under a continuous pressure towards
growth the links tend to saturate and consequently push towards the saturation
of the number of links manageable by every single vertex. Finally the growth
must necessarily end being transferred on the global size of the network, i.e.
to the number of vertices. Applying all this to the whole human kind it turns
out that the ”growth” must in the end be demographic also; if the number
of ”vertices” of the graph does not grow and ”wealth” must grow, the system
saturates and jams. On the other hand the growth of the number of vertices has
to comply with the physical constraints of the environment where the growth
takes place. The debate could go on and evolve for long, but would not be per
se new: after all I have just presented in a more abstract way the subject of
”The limits to growth” and in the next days various specific lectures will do
better than I do. However the aspect I want to highlight in the behaviour of
our network is not the one of the physical constraints.
5.2 The problem of safety/reliability
Let us come again to the number of exchanges that happen per year on the
average through a link of our network, < n >; each exchange, if it is real, is
unavoidably associated with a probability, ε, of undergoing some inconvenience,
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Figure 3: A typical logistic curve describing the saturation in time of a channel
in which a continuous thrust towards the increase of the flux is present.
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breakdown, accident, malfunction. Over big numbers this probability becomes
statistically a global real annual number of ”inconveniences”, ν, given by
ν =< ε >< n > N =< ε > Φ (4)
If we have considered Φ as being proportional to the gross ”wealth” produced
during the year, we may think ν being proportional to the damage D overall
suffered because of the happened inconveniences:
D = ρν (5)
Strictly speaking damage is not simply proportional to the gross wealth: in
general < ε > (which is contained in ν) depends in turn on Φ. Let us think
for instance of a road with vehicles travelling on it; keeping technology, road
and driver fixed, the probability of individual accident grows with the flux of
vehicles.
Summing up, our system behaves more or less like a ferromagnet: magne-
tization grows more than proportionally with the intensity of the magnetizing
field and tends sooner or later to reach a fixed saturation value. The dependence
of ε on Φ changes according to the type of ”inconvenience” and sometimes it
may also be absent: let us merge all this into a hypothetical average of all av-
erages in order to arrive to the < ε > of (4), that will now represent the total
”risk”. In general, and when we are far from saturation, we expect insecurity
to grow while wealth grows, i.e. we expect the ratio between risk and gross
benefit to worsen. Of course this is an unwanted and not at all relished effect;
is it possible to nullify it? Be it car crashes, engine breakdowns, noise injected
into a communication channel, robberies, frauds, bribery or else, one may hope
to keep everything under control below a previously fixed threshold, by means
of an improvement of the efficiency of the system, i.e. of the technologies, the
methods and the controls. And here the problem of the cost of all that comes
to light.
The efficiency of a system, interpreted as the ratio between desired effects
and globally produced effects, cannot grow indefinitely. It stands to reason that
the maximal abstractly attainable value would be 1; actually even the maximal
value attainable in principle is less than 1: ”side unwanted effects” are necessary,
whatever the quality of the employed technology is. Engineers and physicists
in the audience have undoubtedly realized that I am speaking of the first and
second principles of thermodynamics: that kind of laws that parliaments do not
vote and cannot amend, on which autocrats have no power, which are totally
unaffected by the subtleties of rhetoricians.
Consistently with the example I am trying to work out, rather than to effi-
ciency I will refer to the probability of ”inconvenience” for each single exchange:
let us say that we will keep an eye on risk. Since < ε > grows more than pro-
portionally with the flux Φ in the network, we shall try to compensate the
unbalance reducing the risk for a given flux. This aim, as I have already said,
can be pursued improving ”efficiency” by various technological, behavioural,
regulatory measures. All this has a cost, no matter how you evaluate it, and
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Figure 4: Asymptotic decrease of ”risk” with increasing cost. The same δR
corresponds to different δC
.
the typical trend of risk as a function of ”cost” is schematically shown in figure
(4).
What happens is well known: at the beginning, when the efficiency is low
and the risk is high, one obtains relevant results with limited cost, but once the
risk is already relatively low further improvements have bigger and bigger costs.
Let us swap the axes in the figure (or rotate it by 90◦ on the left): one clearly
sees that when the ”risk” tends to the asymptote the cost diverges. Of course
the cost that we can call ’of security’ must be subtracted from the gross wealth
R, proportional to Φ, so that the actually available wealth, U , decreases.
So far the colloquial and qualitative description of what happens. Let us
now try a numerical exercise. Start from the gross wealth R. According to the
wishes and also to the ”doctrine” R (if you prefer: the GDP) should steadily
grow with a geometric progression; in practice its evolution in time should be
described by an exponential function:
R = R0e
χt (6)
We should choose a value for χ. Initially I thought of 2% per year. How-
ever, it occurred to me of reading, on the newspaper La Stampa of September
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5 this year, an article by a professor of economics of the Turin University, Prof.
Mario Deaglio, inspired by some sentences of a singer (Jovanotti) about the
”wonderful” (environmentally friendly) growth. Prof. Deaglio writes1 ”a 1 per
cent growth per year has nothing ’wonderful’, a 5 per cent growth would be
unattainable. Jovanotti’s ’wonderful growth’ corresponds to an average annual
increase of the gross domestic product (the notorious GDP) in the order of a
long term 2.5-3 per cent. Such growth rate has to be steady, non-dehumanizing,
not particularly consumeristic.” That growth rate, according to Deaglio, would
include both the productivity and the employment increase; no material quan-
tity is mentioned: no tons, no kilowatt hour, no mundane variable that could
disturb the ”wonderful growth”. In line with this approach, I will then choose
χ = 0.03/year (7)
which of course corresponds to a similar growth rate for the exchange volume
Φ.
We must now deal with (4) and (5). The majority will expect the total risk to
remain constant or even to decrease while the produced wealth increases; hence
we deduce that people will act upon what I’ll generically call the technology in
order to try and obtain a decrease of < ε > in time big enough to compensate
for the growth of Φ, i.e. people will require that
< ε >= ε0e
−χt (8)
Strictly speaking this result is impossible: no real transfer may happen at
zero risk. Let us however neglect this remark and let us pass to consider the
total cost of security C, that is the quantity schematically represented on the
abscissae of fig. (4). The trend depicted there may be expressed by the formula:
C = κ
ε− ε∗Φ =
κ
< ε > −ε∗
R
ρ
(9)
or even by a number of more complicated expressions. This is just an exercise,
so let us stay happy with (9) where one sees both the proportionality to the total
exchange flux, then in practice to the produced wealth, and the divergence in
correspondence of the asymptotic value ε∗. Let us imagine to start from a
situation at time 0 where the cost of safety is a fraction ψ of the total wealth,
so that we may write:
C =ψ ε0 − ε∗
< ε > −ε∗R (10)
Making the time dependences explicit, the formula becomes
C =ψ ε0 − ε∗
ε0e−χt − ε∗R0e
χt (11)
1The English translation is by the author of the present Introduction.
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Figure 5: The black curve represents the growth of the gross wealth at a rate of
3% per year. The red curve is the time trend of the safety cost, starting from a
1 to 100 ratio with respect to the asymptotic value and of the initial cost with
respect to the initial wealth.
Let us try and see what happens if the initial cost is 1% of the initial wealth
and the initial risk is 100 times bigger than the asymptotic value. Figure (5)
shows the time evolution both of R/R0 and of C/R0:
The most interesting portrayal is obtained when graphing the difference, U ,
between wealth and safety cost, normalized to the initial wealth; see figure (6).
Looking at the diagram a quotation from Leonardo da Vinci comes sponta-
neously to my mind:
Chi scalza il muro, quello gli cade addosso.2
During about 115 years the net wealth or profit, U , grows but in the end
it plunges catastrophically in more or less fifteen years. Of course the result
depends on the numerical values I have chosen. Keeping the ”wonderful” 3%
fixed, what is the change if I modify the ratio between the initial and the
asymptotic risk? Let’s see.
Even assuming a 1000 : 1 ratio between initial and asymptotic risk, the trend
remains the same and the ”gain” in time is around twenty years. If instead the
2”If you dig up the wall, it will fall upon you”. Free translation by the author.
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Figure 6: Time evolution of the net wealth given by the difference between the
gross wealth produced by the growing system and the cost of safety.
16
Figure 7: Black curve: reference case. Blue curve: ε0/ε∗ = 1000. Greenish line:
χ = 0.02.
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annual growth rate is limited to 2% the gained years are about sixty.
This is just an exercise. The real world is far more complicated than that,
but ...
A trend like the one depicted in fig. (6) is often found in the history of human
societies, from the Sumerian civilization to the Roman empire, to many other
cases. The example of the Sumerians is especially interesting because, in their
case, the collapse was due to the unforeseen (and unforeseeable at the time) side
effects of a great technical advance. The development of a sophisticated irriga-
tion system in a dry climate brought, because of evaporation, to irreversibly salt
the soils and led their productivity to collapse. The productivity of the former
Sumerian land remains quite low even today, after four thousand years.
The typical feature is a blooming, almost triumphal, raise followed by a
much shorter and steeper descent:
...the raise is gradual, the ruin is precipitous... (Lucius Anneus Seneca, Letters
to Lucilius, 91-63).
We could call it, as Ugo Bardi does, ”Seneca effect”. For completeness I
should mention that he also introduces a ”Cassandra effect” that we would like
to avoid here.
Besides the historical examples are there circumscribed phenomena where
mechanisms are operating like the ones I described above? Let us think to the
role (and cost) of bureaucracy in our society. Let us think to the development
of e-mail networks and to the percent of our work time we must dedicate to
the handling of the correspondence: each communication is very quick, the
answer time is not. Let us think to informatization and to the queues before
the counters of public offices: the length of the queue does not decrease, the
number of counters does.
5.3 Saturation and capacity of keeping processes under
control
In our idealized network of exchange fluxes I have pretended to believe that each
single vertex can in principle be connected with any other vertex of the net:
this hypothesis is the base of (1). However, as we have seen, both the exchange
channels and the vertices get saturated, which fact leads to transferring the
growth to the total number of vertices. Unavoidably then it becomes gradually
impossible for a vertex, even in principle, to directly communicate with all other
vertices. This fact does not prevent the communication with the parts of the
net out of reach, but implies that the related flux be mediated by the vertices
with which the link is direct; the indirect flux must however be transmitted
through the vertices with which one is in direct touch. Every vertex, then, must
support its own exchange flux together with the flux in transit. The latter then
shortens the saturation times of any single vertex. In other words we can say
that a competition is established concerning the allocation of time to control
3... incrementa lente exeunt, festinatur in damnum.
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your flux against the flux in transit; otherwise stated, the more are the vertices
used for simple transit, the slower becomes the distant exchange. Summing
up, the myth of globalization must face the problem of control: the growth of
the network implies both a parceling of the system in governable islands and a
functional hierarchy of the vertices.
A complicated way to say that an upper limit exists to the physical size of
a single living being composed of cells: there have never existed multicellular
animals bigger than the blue whale (maybe equalled, but not surpassed, by some
terrestrial dinosaur of the Jurassic period). With a growing size the system goes
out of control by a single will.
So far I have exorcised a word I could and maybe I should have used: entropy.
It is a physical quantity introduced by thermodynamics, that can easily be
misused. Anyway, the popular version of its definition says that it is something
having to do with disorder in a system made of a very big number of components;
and this is true. Furthermore one of the non-negotiable laws asserts that in
an isolated complex system whatever happens forces entropy, then disorder,
to grow. The surface layer of our planet is not an isolated system, but it
exchanges with the external space almost only radiation. If the number of
physical processes taking place annually on earth remains more or less stable,
so does the entropy and this is because it is possible to expel energy to space.
However if the number of thermodynamic transformations increases, then, in
order to keep the entropy stable, the surface temperature of the planet must
grow. The phenomenon about which I am speaking now is not the world famous
green-house effect, on which the discussion will be tomorrow: rather it is an
additional complication.
So far the most traditional meaning. It is however possible to define a
statistical entropy associated to complex systems irrespective of strictly thermal
variables. Order and disorder of the books on a shelf can be evaluated in terms of
entropy and it is true that, without ”external” interventions for re-ordering, the
more books you draw and use the more disorder grows. Restoring or maintaining
order requires a dedicated work, that can be assessed in terms of time (to be
subtracted from the productive time) then finally in terms of money. We come
back, by another way, to the Seneca effect.
6 Treating the addict
I have touched upon a number of problems and effects, that could be analyzed
in more formal and technical terms. The relevant feature, however, is that they
are not debatable, even though there are many uncertainties in their formal
description and in their parametrization.
Well, no discussion nor, least of all, any account is taken of them in the
sites where decisions relevant for the community are taken; excepting, at most,
fortuitous actions on symptoms when acute effects appear.
A comparison that comes to my mind is with a doctoral team facing an
addict or an alcoholic in a drug withdrawal syndrome. The patient is sick,
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very sick, because he cannot find the dose. Suffering is real and the danger of
irreversible damages is real too. Everybody knows that, in this situation, the
sheer block of the assumption of the dependence giving substance is not viable;
it is necessary to define a proper exit strategy that includes a gradual elimination
of the substance, accompanied by a controlled administration of some less toxic
substitute and by protective and healing measures. In any case the final goal is
to free the patient from his dependence.
However in the case of the ”growth” disease the medical team, up against
recurring withdrawal crises, has only one strategy: to strive for providing the
patient with the dose he misses and, since the dependence increases more and
more, to try and procure in turn increasing doses. The final result of such a
”therapy” is rather evident.
The fact that makes things harder is however that in our case the patient
and the medical team essentially coincide.
Those who professionally deal or have the misfortune to care alcoholics or
drug addicts perfectly know one thing. That any exit strategy from a depen-
dence state by means of a withdrawal therapy requires an inescapable prelimi-
nary condition: the patient must agree. And this is the mess.
7 Reason or scope intelligence?
Human beings have a bizarre feature: their mind is equipped with analysis tools
of the reality which enable, in a reasonably reliable way, to forecast the con-
sequences of their behaviours even over medium/long times and over distances
much bigger than the ones they can directly inspect by means of their senses.
Let us call this ability: reason.
Human beings however, to some extent, share with the other animals an
apparently similar ability, which however does not bother about the future,
if not immediate, and about the space range, if not directly perceived by the
senses. This ability I could call ”scope intelligence”.
We know that chimpanzees are able to build simple tools, in order, for in-
stance, to facilitate the extraction of honey from honeycombs hosted within
holes in the logs of trees. Crows too have learnt, in order to smash nut shells,
to bring them flying at a given height then letting them fall against a hard
surface. Examples are abundant and describe the nature of what I have called
scope intelligence.
Let us now imagine some chimpanzees who, keeping the purpose to pull
out honey from logs (or to procure everyday’s food in similar situations) learn
to build not only simple wooden sticks to be introduced into the cavity then
licked, but drills, diggers, explosives and so on. This peculiar species of ”ad-
vanced” chimpanzees would rapidly reach the depletion of the food resources of
its environment, ending then in its own extinction.
Specific human civilizations have indeed concluded their life like that, col-
lapsing under the unforeseen effects of some progress introduced thanks to the
scope intelligence and in the helplessness of reason: I have already mentioned
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the example of Sumerians and the salinization of their agricultural land, source
of their prosperity.
Today’s situation, however, is still different, because reason is now able to
predict many effects of an expansion of economy that pretends to last indefi-
nitely; but this type of prediction is either ignored or rejected. We are facing a
real conflict between reason and scope intelligence, between human and animal
nature, and the match risks to be compromised by a fact ironically expressed
by Albert Einstein who happened to remark that
the difference between stupidity and genius is that genius has its limits.
Notwithstanding the difficulties, however, most of the international scientific
community believes that we can make the grade and that reason will in the end
have the upper hand on the scope intelligence.
Our condition has very well been described in what we could call a laic
parable told in the 19th century by Robert Louis Stevenson: Strange case of
Dr Jekyll and Mr Hide. Dr Jekyll is a reasonable and respectable person, he is
aware of what is wise to do; however the man who takes decisions on what to
do is Mr Hide. One might think, and very often some think so, that it would
suffice for Jekyll to get rid of Hide and everything would be solved, but when
one tries that way tragically realizes that Dr Jekyll and Mr Hide are the same
person...
This is a conference for Dr Jekyll, who assembled here in order to clarify his
mind on what to do. The point however is that afterwards it will be necessary
to bridle Mr Hide. We are going to tackle this problem again at the end of our
four days.
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